UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-3-2016

State v. Mottaz Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43626

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Mottaz Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43626" (2016). Not Reported. 2848.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2848

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
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ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9525
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
SUSAN K. MOTTAZ,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
________________________________ )

NO. 43626
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2015-6243
APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Susan Mottaz was sentenced to a unified term of eight years, with two years
fixed, after pleading guilty to one count of domestic violence, having a prior felony
conviction for domestic violence within fifteen years. She contends the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors
that exist in this case.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On April 30, 2015, Ms. Mottaz had an argument with her husband and bit him on
the hand, leaving bite marks. (7/29/15 Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.17.) Ms. Mottaz called
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the police to report the incident and was arrested. (Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”), p.3.) She was charged by Information with one count of domestic violence,
having a prior felony conviction for domestic violence within fifteen years. (R., pp.5051.) Ms. Mottaz pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (R., pp.54-60.) Although the
parties agreed to mental health court, Ms. Mottaz was determined to be ineligible, and
the case proceeded in the district court. (R., p.56; PSI, pp.30-31; 10/2/14 Tr., p.24,
Ls.18-21.)
The district court sentenced Ms. Mottaz to a unified term of eight years, with two
years fixed. (R., p.81.) The district court retained jurisdiction for a period of 365 days
and recommended that Ms. Mottaz participate in a mental health rider and undergo a
neuropsychological evaluation.
October 5, 2015.

(R., pp.81-82.)

(R., pp.80-84.)

The judgment was entered on

Ms. Mottaz filed a timely notice of appeal on

October 7, 2015. (R., pp.86-88.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Ms. Mottaz, a unified
sentence of eight years, with two years fixed, in light of the mitigating factors that exist
in this case?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Ms. Mottaz, A Unified
Sentence Of Eight Years, With Two Years Fixed, In Light Of The Mitigating Factors That
Exist In This Case
Ms. Mottaz asserts that, given any view of the facts, her unified sentence of eight
years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the
district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating
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that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).

“When a trial court exercises its

discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)). “A sentence is reasonable if it
appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to
achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id.
(citation omitted). “When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court will
make an independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id.
(quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The sentence the district court imposed upon Ms. Mottaz was not reasonable.
The first factor for this Court to independently examine is the nature of the offense. See
Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. Ms. Mottaz called the police after she bit her husband during
the course of an argument. (PSI, p.126.) The bite did not break the skin, but did leave
bite marks. (7/29/15 Tr., p.21, L.21 – p.22, L.17.) Ms. Mottaz was 64 years old at the
time of the offense and had been married to her husband for 27 years. (PSI, pp.1, 21.)
Ms. Mottaz had not been drinking alcohol or using any illegal substances. (PSI, pp.11,
21.)

When asked during the domestic violence evaluation how she felt about the

incident, she stated, “I’m sorry. I’ve been sorry for months and months and months. I
feel really bad about it.

I’ve told my husband too.”

(PSI, p.24).

At sentencing,

Mr. Mottaz testified that he and his wife “are in love with each other” and that he and his
son want her to come home. (10/2/15 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9). This is not the type of crime
that warrants a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed.
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The second factor for this Court to independently examine is the character of the
offender. See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. Ms. Mottaz is not the type of offender who
warrants a sentence of incarceration of any length. Ms. Mottaz was abused as a child
and has a history of depression and suicide attempts. (PSI, pp.40-41.) Despite these
challenges, she worked as a registered nurse for over 30 years and is a breast cancer
survivor. (PSI, pp.21, 475.) Most significantly, it appears that Ms. Mottaz was and is
suffering from a “mild neurocognitive defect . . . involving executive functioning or frontal
abilities.” (PSI, p.61.) This was the conclusion reached by Dr. Craig Beaver, who
performed a forensic mental health examination on Ms. Mottaz prior to sentencing.
(PSI,

pp.51-67.)

Dr.

Beaver’s

examination

of

Ms.

Mottaz

highlights

the

unreasonableness of the sentence imposed.
Dr. Beaver diagnosed Ms. Mottaz with bipolar disorder, borderline personality
disorder, and an “[u]nspecified neurocognitive disorder with behavioral disturbance.”
(PSI, pp.63-64.) Dr. Beaver described Ms. Mottaz’s functional impairment as follows:
[T]he combination of her frontal/executive dysfunction and a borderline
personality style creates significant issues for her. I am concerned this
combination results in her having limited capacity to control her anger and
at times her behavior. Unfortunately if her dementia is progressive, this
pattern may accelerate over time. Additionally, her bipolar disorder, when
it is not properly treated, also likely worsens this circumstance
considerably. I suspect some of the acting-out episodes occurred within
the context of her fluctuating mood disorder.
(PSI, p.64.) Dr. Beaver concluded that Ms. Mottaz’s personality issues are likely to
become “more readily apparent and dysfunctional” and expressed “doubt[ ] . . . that
further incarceration time will have much of a limiting impact on some of the behavioral
concerns of Ms. Mottaz.” (PSI, pp.62-63, 65.)
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There is every indication that prison time has not and will not serve as a deterrent
to Ms. Mottaz, and has not and cannot rehabilitate her. At sentencing, Ms. Mottaz’s
counsel informed the district court that Ms. Mottaz “has had a very, very hard time at the
jail” and “really just wants to go home and be with her family again.” (10/2/15 Tr., p.16,
Ls.9-16.) Ms. Mottaz told the district court, “I know there’s something wrong with me.
I’ve been trying for years to get that changed. And I’ve been to prison; it doesn’t do me
any good.” (10/2/15 Tr., p.19, Ls.8-11.) The district court acknowledged at sentencing
that “this is not an appropriate case for simply imposing sentence without some other
alternative.” (10/2/15 Tr., p.28, Ls.16-19.) It thus ordered Ms. Mottaz to participate in a
rider. (10/2/15 Tr., p.28, Ls.22-24.) The fact that the district court ordered Ms. Mottaz
to participate in a rider does not make the sentence imposed reasonable considering
Ms. Mottaz’s character and, in particular, her progressively worsening neurocognitive
deficits. She is in need of long-term mental health care, not incarceration.
The third factor for this Court to independently examine is the protection of the
public interest. See Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. Dr. Beaver concluded that Ms. Mottaz
does not pose a significant risk to the general public and “does not have a history of
being violent in the community.” (PSI, p.65.) Ms. Mottaz does, however, present a high
risk of future violence towards her husband. (PSI, pp.27, 65.) Dr. Beaver speculated
that “unless [Ms. Mottaz] gets more intensive mental health services and remains
stabilized on medication, she will continue to episodically make suicidal gestures and
have some behavioral-control issues.” (PSI, p.65.) Ms. Mottaz’s husband nonetheless
asked the district court to release her and let her come home.
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(PSI, p.29.)

He

explained in a letter to the district court, “We still . . . love each other and want a chance
to get this right for her and myself and [our son], one more time.” (PSI, p.29.)
There is no indication that Ms. Mottaz is receiving intensive mental health
services and stabilizing medication while on her rider. The sentence imposed by the
district court is thus not likely to prevent any future problems, but just delay them.
Ms. Mottaz is mentally ill, with a condition that appears likely to progress.

As

Ms. Mottaz’s attorney explained at sentencing, “[S]ending [Ms. Mottaz] to prison is [not]
going to help anyone. It’s not going to help society. It’s not going to help [Ms. Mottaz].
She will end up just, essentially, rotting away in our state correctional facility . . . .”
(10/2/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-24.) In light of these mitigating factors, and notwithstanding
the aggravating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court was not reasonable
and should be reduced.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Mottaz respectfully requests that the Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that her case be remanded to the district court
for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 3rd day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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